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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of policy initiatives co-ordinated by Asian national
governments on rmscomposition of external nance. Using a unique rm-level
database of eight Asian countries- Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand over the period of 1996-2012 and a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, the results show a signicant impact of policy
initiatives on rmschoice to external nance. We nd that rms increased their
uptake of long-term debt, while decreased their short-term debt. We also document
that less risky and more protable rms are more signicantly a¤ected by the
policy change than riskier and less protable rms. Finally, we show that the
improved access to external nance after the policy initiative helped rms to raise
their investment spending.
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1 Introduction
The 199798 Asian nancial crisis prompted policymakers in Asia and the Pacic to
initiate a series of reforms aimed at the development and strengthening of the regional
bond markets. The most prominent initiative of Asian Bond Funds (ABF and ABF-2) was
undertaken in two waves in 2003 and 2005. The main role of this policy intervention was
to broaden investor participation and improve market infrastructure in order to expand
the domestic bond markets. As post-ABF data become widely available and their Latin
American counterparts seek to adopt similar programmes, it is important to examine the
extent to which this program has been successful in meeting the above objectives. The
present paper provides new evidence on corporate nancial choices after the introduction
of policy initiatives in Asia. More specically, we ask whether these initiatives have led
to better/improved access of rms to external nance compared to rms that operate in
an economy that did not participate in this policy intervention.
There is evidence that the ABF encouraged expansion and liquidity in the Asian do-
mestic bond markets by implementing several market reforms such as liberalising foreign
exchange administration rules, tax reforms to exempt withholding tax of non-resident
investors, improving regulatory framework for exchange traded funds, strengthening do-
mestic market infrastructure and decreasing cross-border settlement risk, creating trans-
parent and credible bond indices (Packer and Remolona, 2012). These reforms helped in
expanding the domestic bond markets and their issuer base. The share of local currency
bond markets increased substantially from 42.8% since the launch of the ABMI in 2003 to
54.5% in Q3 2008, thus improving market liquidity in the Asian markets (Spiegel, 2012)1.
Comparing the issuance of long-term debt of participating rms in our sample with
non-participating rms reveals a large wedge between the two groups: USD 66.89 bil-
lion for the former versus 2.91 billion for the latter. Even when making a before-after
comparison, we can see that the average long-term debt of participating rms increased
from USD 59.25 billion before the ABF to 72.44 billion after the ABF. However, it is not
1Levinger et al. (2014) showed evidence that the corporate bond market capitalisation in Asia has
reached to 24.2% of the regions GDP by 2012 from 16.7% in 2008. In terms of value, the amount of
corporate bonds outstanding has almost tripled since 2008, amounting to USD 3.2 trillion by Q3 2013.
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clear how much of this change stems from the policy change itself and how much is due
from improvements in the general economic climate. A di¤erence-in-di¤erences model
will tease out the regional bond development and policy inuences. In order to separate
the e¤ects of this regional development from the e¤ect of regional policy initiatives, we
refer to Taiwan as a control. Taiwan saw similar development in its national bond market
and is comparable to the other Asian economies, but it did not participate in the ABF,
ABF2 or ABMI initiatives.
The identifying assumption for the research design is that economies that participated
in the policy initiative and those that did not would have trended similarly in the absence
of the policy change. The parallel trends assumption is supported by the institutional
background of the Asian bond initiatives as well as graphical evidence2. Figure 1 graphs
the evolution of bond market size in Asian markets over the sample period of 1996-2012.
Panel A displays similar growth patterns of bond market size for both the control and
treated groups until the end of the Asian nancial crisis in 1999. However, from 1999
there is an upward trend in bond market size for the treated group and the gap between
the control and treated group further widens after the introduction of ABF-2 at the end of
2004 (see the solid vertical line which indicates the introduction of the policy initiative).
Panel B, which shows the evolution of corporate bond market, displays a similar pattern.
It shows a widening gap between the control and treated group after the introduction
of the policy initiatives. While, panel C shows that the control group (Taiwan) showed
similar growth patterns over the years with majority of East Asian economies in terms
of bond market development3. Figure 2 graphs the development of the banking sector
in the treated and control group over the same period. The graph displays the growing
trend of the banking sector in the treated group after the Asian nancial crisis, while the
growth in the control group almost remains constant throughout the period. The graphs
described above conrm the parallel trends assumption in our data which suggests that
2In the robustness section of the paper we present a placebo test to show that there are no underlying
trends in the pre-policy period which can inuence the treatment e¤ect.
3Amongst the countries in our treated group, Korea has the largest bond market. Hence, in order to
conrm that our results are not driven by Korea, we exclude this country from the treated group. We
nd that our results, reported in the robustness section, are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar
to our main results including Korea.
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in the absence of the policy change the two groups would have continued to track each
other.
Much of the empirical investigation of rmsexternal nance considers how exoge-
nous shocks a¤ect rmsnancing choices. Bris et al. (2014) shows that non-nancial
rms from euro countries with previously weak currencies considerably increased their
debt nancing after the introduction of the Euro. Leary (2009) highlights the impact
of a market for certicates of deposit which led to increase in bank credit and rms
leverage. Su (2009) studies the impact of syndicated loan ratings introduced in 1995
on borrowing of rms that obtained a rating, nding that rms that are able to obtain
a rating are able to use more debt, which also increases rmsasset growth, cash acqui-
sitions, and investment in working capital. Further, Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show
that the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert had a negative e¤ect on rmsnance and
investments, especially for those which were using high-yield debt nancing. In the Asian
context, recent work by Mizen and Tsoukas (2014) demonstrates that regional initiatives
have been an important step towards greater bond issuance by rms in Asia, mostly by
fostering market deepening and improving liquidity.
But it is not clear whether the demand for all types of external nance will increase
proportionately. Some components of external nance may prove more attractive than
others, and the demand for bank borrowing for example, may exceed demand for credit
obtained through the sale of marketable debt or equity. Equally, short-term debt may
be replaced by longer-term debt if short-term interest rates fall below the rates that are
expected to prevail in the longer run. In addition, some types of rms may nd that
the credit constraints that they face on the supply side, from the markets and nancial
intermediaries, are relaxed less quickly than for other types of rms. Firms that were
previously only able to obtain credit from banks, perhaps because they were too small
to be listed on the stock exchange or to issue their own commercial paper or bonds, nd
that other forms of credit become more readily available.
In this paper we look at the nancial health of the rm, reected in the quality of
its balance sheet. Then we consider di¤erent types of external nance such as short-
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term or long-term debt and we construct ratios that measure rmschoice of external
nance. Finally, we observe a unique policy experiment, namely the ABF initiative,
which will be used to identify the e¤ects of the policy change on rmscomposition of
external nance. Our empirical work is based on an assessment of the policy initiative
on rms access to external nance using an unbalanced panel of 7,436 Asian listed
rms between 1996-2012. We merge data from di¤erent sources including Bondware,
Bloomberg, Standard and Poors Compustat Global database, Global Financial database
and IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in three important ways. First, we
analyse the role of the Asian Bond Funds (ABF and ABF2) and the Asian Bond Market
Initiative (ABMI) in the composition of external nance. While previous studies identied
that the regional initiatives in Asia had a greater and positive impact on rmsdecisions
to issue bonds in Asia (see Mizen and Tsoukas, 2014), we go one step further by examining
the impact of these initiatives on rmsexternal nance using the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
method.
Second, we exploit rm-level heterogeneity by considering whether rms that face
nancial constraints may be more or less likely to alter their composition of external
nance. In doing so, we employ characteristics such as rmsprotability and coverage
ratio as measures of nancial constraints. These characteristics are likely to be critically
important in inuencing rmsaccess to nancial markets and we intend to explore how
the interplay between changes in nancial health and the introduction of policy initiatives,
a¤ect the choice of external nance for more and less constrained rms.
Finally, we build on the extant literature of rmsinvestment spending (Fazzari et al.,
1988; Almeida and Campello, 2007), by considering whether the policy intervention by
the Asian regional governments has impacted on rmsinvestment spending. Hence, we
explore the relationship between external nance and rms investment spending before
and after the policy initiative. We also allow for the fact that rms of di¤erent riskiness,
with varying levels of prots might respond to the policy initiative disproportionately.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief review
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of the relevant literature. In section three, we present the data used in our empirical
analysis along with summary statistics. We describe the econometric modelling strategy
in section four, and we report the econometric results in section ve. In section six we
check the robustness of our ndings and we provide concluding remarks in section seven.
2 Background literature
In the past, Asian bond markets have been identied as under-developed and illiq-
uid. Minimum e¢ cient scale, corruption and low level of bureaucracy, poor accounting
standards (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2006), capital controls, taxation, lim-
ited availability of hedging instruments (Takeuchi, 2006) were some of the obstacles in
developing the bond markets in Asia. However, since the 1990s many emerging countries
in Asia have taken important steps to enhance their nancial markets. Especially after
the Asian crisis, the need to develop sound and more liquid bond markets to prevent
further capital account crisis was realised and regional governments started contributing
towards the development of local bond markets in Asia.
The most noteworthy policy intervention was undertaken by the Asia-Pacic policy-
makers to allow bond markets to develop in two waves since 2003. The rst phase of
the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) initiative, namely ABF-1, was introduced in June 2003 and
USD 1 billion were fully invested in dollar denominated bonds in the Executive Meeting
of East Asia and the Pacic (EMEAP) central bank economies4. The second phase of
this initiative was launched in December 2004 called ABF-2. In the second wave USD
2 billion were invested in domestic bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign issuers
in eight local currency markets of the region, where the eight EMEAP central banks
operate. These markets include China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The ABF-2 initiative was planned to improve size
and liquidity in the Asian bond markets along with enhancing investor awareness and
4EMEAP central banks include the Reserve Bank of Australia, Peoples Bank of China, Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore and Bank of
Thailand.
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interest in Asian bonds. In our study, we will make use of this natural experiment to
evaluate its inuence on rmschoice of external nance.
A more detailed review of the nancial systems in Asian countries is presented by
Didier and Schmukler (2014). They highlighted that bond markets expanded by almost
57% in East Asia, 345% in China and 66% in India, during the 2000s relative to the 1990s.
Despite of substantial growth between 2000 and 2009, private bond markets including
corporate and nancial institutions in Asian economies remain relatively small compared
to G-7 economies. In contrast, the developments in the Asian bond market are still the
highest among other developing countries. For instance, the bond markets in Eastern
Europe and Latin America grew respectively at 28% and 32% of GDP, exceptionally
lower than 56% in East Asia. The banking system in the East Asian economies increased
by 47% between 1980-89 and 2000-2009, while in Eastern Europe, G-7 economies and
Latin America increased by 25%, 20% and 5%, respectively during the same period.
The structure of private credit and public credit have changed considerably across the
world over the past two decades. In East Asian economies, private sector lending has
increased from 44% to 72% of GDP, compared to 50% in the 1980s to 98% in the 2000s in
other advanced economies. While, public sector lending accounts 10% and 13% of total
claims by the banking sector in G-7 and East Asian economies during the 2000s. Thus,
these nancial trends overall highlight the fact that Asian economies are more developed
compared to Eastern Europe and Latin America, due to rapid nancial improvements in
the region during the 2000s.
Moving to the literature which attempts to identify the main determinants of rms
choice of external nance, we note that there is a variety of rm-level and macroeconomic
factors that inuence rm nancing. With respect to the rm-level characteristics, size,
age, collateral, protability and riskiness are highlighted as important factors a¤ecting
access to external nance by rms (see Bougheas et al., 2006). Business group a¢ liation
(Shin and Park, 1999) and availability of credit information (Tang, 2009) are other fac-
tors a¤ecting rmschoice of capital structure. At the macroeconomic level, monetary
policy shocks (Kashyap et al., 1993), institutional di¤erences and development of nan-
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cial markets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; Fan et al., 2010) and higher costs
and barriers to entry (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) are typically highlighted as important
variables inuencing rmsaccess to external nance.
The studies discussed above provide a useful background to explore the linkage be-
tween rmsaccess to external nance and Asian bond market initiatives. In addition,
we also try to analyse the impact of debt availability on rmsinvestment spending in the
post-policy period. In the following sections, we explain our data and empirical strategy.
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 The baseline model
To examine the impact of bond market policy initiatives on rmsaccess to external
nance, we employ di¤erence-in-di¤erences methods 5. More specically, we evaluate the
impact of the policy intervention by comparing di¤erences in external nance composition
before and after the policy change for rms in seven Asian economies that participated in
this initiative (treatment) namely- Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philip-
pines, Singapore and Thailand. We then compare these di¤erences with comparable
di¤erences from a sample of rms in Taiwan (control), which did not participate in the
policy initiative but faced similar trajectory in rmsnancing activities.
The dependent variables capture measures of external nance and are based on the
ratios of short-term debt to total debt (Bougheas et al., 2006) and long-term debt to
total assets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999)6. The former ratio refers to access
to bank nance versus market nance, while the latter ratio is more related to access
to bond nancing, compared to total assets held by the rms. These ratios help to
remove demand-side inuences as increase in the demand of credit is likely to a¤ect both
5Several recent studies use this methodology to estimate the impact of minimum wages on employment
(Card and Krueger, 1994; Leigh, 2003), the e¤ect of grants and subsidies on exporting activity (Görg et
al., 2008) and the role of the nancial crisis in corporate investment (Duchin et al., 2010).
6Short-term debt is made up of the sum of bank overdrafts, short-term group and director loans,
hire purchase, leasing and other short-term loans, but is predominantly bank nance. Long-term debt
is made of bonds, mortgages, loans and similar debt, which represents debt obligations due more than
one year from the companys balance sheet date or due after the current operating cycle.
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numerator and denominator of the ratio, leaving the ratio unchanged (Bougheas et al.,
2006). We estimate a baseline model of the following kind:
STDijt
TDijt
= 0 + 1Treatj + 2Aftert + 3Treatj  Aftert + 4Xijt + eijt; (1)
LTDijt
TAijt
= 0 + 1Treatj + 2Aftert + 3Treatj  Aftert + 4Xijt + eijt (2)
where i = 1, 2, . . . ., N refers to the cross-section of units (rms in this case), in country j
at time t. STDijt
TDijt
and LTDijt
TAijt
are the ratios of short-term debt to total debt and long-term
debt to total assets, respectively. Treatj is a country dummy which takes value one if a
country participates in the policy initiative and zero otherwise. Aftert is a time dummy
which takes value one for the period 2005-2012 and zero otherwise7. The policy e¤ect is
given by the coe¢ cient of the interaction term, Treatj  Aftert. The coe¢ cient on the
interaction term measures the di¤erence in the choice of external nance between those
rms that experience an anticipated policy change and those that do not. If the policy
initiative has a crucial e¤ect on access to nance with a considerable di¤erence between
the control and treated group, then it should have a signicant coe¢ cient value.
The models are estimated using di¤erence-in-di¤erences with rm xed e¤ects to
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the rm-level. Country dummies are included in
the model to control for country-level di¤erences, while time dummies interacted with
industry dummies are included in order to control for all time-varying demand shocks at
the industry level (Brown and Petersen, 2009). We cluster standard errors at the rm
level as the observations over time might be correlated within rms. Finally, X is a vector
which includes other explanatory factors at both rm and country-level and eijt are the
disturbance terms.
In vector X we use a number of rm-level and macro-economic variables which have
been found to inuence rmschoice of external nance. To begin with the rm-specic
7By observing the treatment after 2005, we are mainly focusing on the impact of ABF-2 introduced
at the end of 2004. ABF-2 initiative di¤ers from the others as it involves the actual creation of local
currency bond funds. The earlier ABF initiative had limited itself to dollar-denominated issues that are
traded mostly in more developed international bond markets. ABF was important because it a¤orded the
EMEAP central banks an opportunity to work together for building trust in order to foster cooperation
and further develop nancial markets in the region (Ma and Remolona, 2006).
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characteristics, previous literature postulates that size is an important determinant of
external nancing. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (Mizen
and Tsoukas, 2014). Larger rms have better access to external nance as they are
less nancially constrained, while smaller rms are more dependent on short-term bank
nancing (Bougheas et al., 2006).
Firms liquidity is measured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Ac-
cording to Ozkan (2001), liquidity of the rms is likely to have a mixed impact on access
to external nancing. Higher liquidity might encourage rms to have higher debt ratios
due to increased ability to meet short-term obligations, implying a positive relationship
between liquidity and external nance. While, rms with higher liquidity might also re-
duce their debt access exerting a negative impact on external nance. Following Bougheas
et al. (2006), gearing is measured by total liabilities to shareholders equity. González et
al. (2007) show that more leveraged rms have fewer requirements of external nancing.8
Following Mizen et al. (2012), the expansion rate of rms is measured by the ratio
of investments to total assets. According to Datta et al. (2000), faster growing rms are
more likely to issue bonds compared to rms with less opportunities for expansion. Also,
rms with higher expansion rate are likely to undertake bond issuance earlier (Hale and
Santos, 2008). Firms operating cycle is calculated as the ratio of net sales to net xed
assets. Firms with higher operating cycle, depend more on short-term debt to nance
the sales (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Finally, cash ow is measured by the
ratio of earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization to total
assets (Almeida and Campello, 2010). Firms with higher levels of cash ow or higher cash
surplus are expected to reduce their leverage (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).
In addition to rm-level variables, we also control for other macro-economic factors
in vector X such as GDP growth rate, legal regulation and balance of trade9. Among
these factors, GDP growth rate and balance of trade (scaled by GDP) are measures of
8On the contrary, Mizen and Tsoukas (2014) show that higher leveraged rms are more likely to issue
corporate bonds.
9We also control for other additional controls such as stock market capitalisation, global liquidity
indicator and a global nancial crisis dummy. These results are given in section 6.5 and we conrm that
our main results remain unchanged even after including other control variables.
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general economic development. Better economic conditions might encourage rms to
shift towards non-debt liabilities showing a negative e¤ect on external nance. Firms in
countries with higher levels of legal regulation are more likely to rely on external nancing
due to reduced information asymmetries resulting in higher growth (La Porta et al., 1998)
and better working of nancial contracts (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).
3.2 Access to external nance and investment after the policy
change
In this section, we explore the inuence of external nance on rms investment
spending in the post-policy period10. One of the objectives of the Asian bond market
initiatives is to provide alternative sources of nancing for private and public investments
to enterprises (Kawai, 2010). It is particularly interesting to examine the impact of
long-term debt issued on rms investment spending as the Asian Bond Fund initiatives
are expected to expand long-term debt issuance. We argue that this is likely to have
a positive e¤ect on rmsinvestment spending. To test this hypothesis, the dependent
variable of rms investment spending (Inv) is measured as the ratio of annual capital
expenditure to total assets (Duchin et al., 2010). The models are estimated as follows:
Invijt = 0 + 1Treatj + 2Aftert + 3Levijt + 4Treatj  Aftert  Levijt + a5Treatj 
Aftert + a6Aftert  Levijt + a7Treatj  Levijt + 8Qijt + 9CFijt + eijt; (3)
where Levijt refers to the measures of external nance i.e. both short-term and long-
term debt ratios, CF measures rms cash ow and Q controls for rms investment
opportunities. The main variable of interest is the interaction term between leverage and
the DD coe¢ cient which is given by Treatj Aftert Levijt, captures the impact of post-
policy access to external nance on rmsinvestment expenses for the treated group. Due
10We also explored the direct impact of the ABF policies on rmsinvestment spending and found a
positive and signicant impact, implying an increase in investment spending by rms after these policies
were introduced.
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to data unavailability on market value of assets (e.g. number of shares outstanding and
stock price) in Global Compustat we are unable to construct Tobins Q (see also Baum
et al., 2011), but investment opportunities are controlled for in two ways. First, following
Konings et al. (2003) and Bakucs et al. (2009), sales growth is used as a proxy for Tobins
Q. Second, time dummies interacted with industry dummies in all the specications are
used as an indirect way of controlling for investment opportunities (see Guariglia et al.,
2012).
3.3 Accounting for rm-level heterogeneity
Intuitively, not all rms are expected to benet equally from the above mentioned
policy initiatives. Fazzari et al. (1988) highlight the importance of di¤erences across rms
in relation with nancial constraints originating from the imperfections of the capital
market. Due to asymmetric information rms facing higher costs of external nance
are likely to be more nancially constrained. Bris et al. (2014) nd that larger rms
in the Euro area beneted the most from nancial integration. Consistent with this
result, Gozzi et al. (2010) nd that larger rms have better nancing from international
capital markets. Stiebale (2011) further stressed that nancially constrained rms face
di¢ culties in obtaining external nance. We also argue that rms that face nancial
constraints might be less well positioned to take advantage of the policy initiatives in Asia
since these rms are more susceptible to information asymmetry e¤ects. It is well known
that there is little public information available for nancially constrained rms and it is
di¢ cult for nancial institutions to gather this information. Obtaining external nance
is therefore likely to be particularly di¢ cult and/or costly for them. We hypothesise,
therefore, that nancially unconstrained rms are more likely to reap the benets of a
policy change.
To test this hypothesis, we divide our rms into constrained and unconstrained groups
using two main criteria: prots and coverage ratio. The former classication scheme is
measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes relative to total assets (Baker
and Wurgler, 2002). Evidence shows that less protable rms are more nancially con-
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strained (Livdan et al., 2009). Coverage ratio is measured as earnings before interest and
taxes over total debt which measures project quality (Mizen and Tsoukas, 2012). Hence,
this classication scheme captures rmscreditworthiness.11 As the policy initiative might
be related to unobserved within-rm changes, rms are divided into constrained and un-
constrained categories using the pre-policy period of 1996-200412. Firms are classied
as constrained if their prots and coverage ratio are below the 50th percentile of the
distribution in the pre-policy period.
Further, we investigate the di¤erential impact of the inuence of external nance on
rmsinvestment spending across constrained and unconstrained rms. Theory predicts
that rms with nancial frictions accompanied with negative shocks to external nance
might lack su¢ cient nancial slack to fund protable investment opportunities internally
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). These e¤ects are stronger for constrained rms that face
higher costs in raising external capital (Duchin et al., 2010).
4 Data and summary statistics
4.1 Data
The data for this paper are drawn from Dealogic Bondware, Bloomberg, Standard
and Poors Compustat Global, Global Financial database and IMD World Competitive-
ness Yearbook (WCY). Our data covers eight Asian economies namely Hong Kong SAR,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand over the period
1996 to 201213.
Bondware is used to identify corporate bonds issued in international markets and to
11Interest coverage was used by Guariglia (1999) as an indicator of nancial constraints to identify
di¤erences in inventory investment.
12A rm is classied as constrained or unconstrained in the post-policy period of 2006-2012 using
values of 2004, one year prior to the onset of the policy as rm variables are likely to be endogenous to
the choices made by rms.
13We do not take into consideration China due to its disparities with other East Asian economies
in terms of growth, capital account convertibility and restricted nancial markets. Corporate savings
in China are higher due to the domination of state-owned banks and restricted equity market, which
favours the large rms by improving their retained earnings and protability (Lin, 2009). In addition,
the repressed nancial system in China provides cheap capital (lower interest rates) which again favour
large rms (Prasad, 2009).
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assemble data relating to issue date, maturity date, outstanding amount and currency14.
We use Bloomberg to categorise similar data for rms that issue bonds in the Asian
domestic markets. The data thus, covers bond issues of rms denominated in local
currency as well as in foreign currency, mainly US dollars.
Balance sheet and prot (loss) data are taken from Compustat Global, which provides
market information on active and inactive companies throughout the world. Our initial
sample included a total of 71,792 annual observations on 7,436 companies. Finally, the
data for economic factors such as GDP growth rate, balance of trade (scaled by GDP) and
legal regulation are drawn from the Global Financial database and IMD WCY database.
Following normal selection criteria, companies with incomplete records of explanatory
variables and negative sales are excluded from the data. In addition, observations in the
1% from upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables are excluded
to control for the potential inuence of outliers. Finally, the panel has an unbalanced
structure with a total of 62,237 annual observations and 518 rms in Hong Kong SAR, 451
in Indonesia, 1,599 in Korea, 1,219 in Malaysia, 253 in the Philippines, 861 in Singapore,
1,745 in Taiwan, and 640 in Thailand that function between 1996 and 2012 for di¤erent
sectors such as manufacturing, utilities, resources, services and nancials.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 shows summary statistics for all the variables, distinguishing between control
and treated groups, as well as before and after the introduction of the policy initiative.
We report values for the whole sample (column 1); treated and control groups (columns
2 and 3); before and after the policy initiative (columns 5 and 6). We also report p-
values for the test of equality of means (columns 4 and 7). From columns 2 and 3
we nd signicant di¤erences in the short and long-term debt issued across the two
groups of economies. Further, columns 5 and 6 show the debt levels for pre- and post-
policy periods. Regarding the short-term debt we are unable to observe any signicant
di¤erences between the two time periods. On the other hand, long-term debt values
14The denition of corporate bonds is in line with recent studies on Asian bond markets (see Mizen
and Tsoukas, 2014) and includes all non-government long-term issues in a given currency.
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show considerable improvement after the introduction of the policy and this di¤erence is
signicant at the 5% level. With respect to other variables, we nd that rms are larger,
have higher levels of gearing, lower liquidity and expansion rate and higher investment
spending in the treated group compared to the control group. As for country-specic
variables, the treated group displays higher GDP growth, lower legal regulation and
higher balance of trade compared to the control group. Moving to columns 5 and 6, all
variables show signicant di¤erences before and after the policy with GDP growth being
the only exception. Introduction of the policy, on average, helped in improving rm-level
factors such as rm size, liquidity, expansion rate and operating cycle of rms.
Overall, two points can be highlighted from these preliminary statistics. First, there is
a noticeable di¤erence between the control and treated group in terms of both short and
long-term debt issuances. Second, there is an increase in the level of long-term debt after
the introduction of the policy initiatives. In addition, there is a notable improvement
in the performance of rms highlighted by the rm-level characteristics after the policy
initiative. In the following sections, a formal regression analysis framework tests the role
of the policy initiative in rmsaccess to external nance.
5 Empirical results
5.1 The baseline model
Table 2 reports the results for the baseline model. The main variable of interest is
the DD estimate, Treatj  Aftert, which signies the impact of the policy initiatives on
the treated group. We nd evidence that the introduction of the ABF initiative had a
important e¤ect on the rmschoice of external nance. Firmsdecreased their short-
term debt, while increased their uptake of long-term debt. To ascertain the magnitude
of the DD coe¢ cient, we calculate percentage point e¤ects by dividing the coe¢ cient
value (marginal e¤ect) with the predicted probability of the model. We show that the
introduction of the policy in the treated group led to a reduction in rmsaccess to short-
term debt by 4.87% and an increase in rmsaccess to long-term debt by 11.96%. This
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nding highlights the fact that policy initiative was benecial for the rms in the treated
group as it helped them to increase their access to long-term debt while reducing their
short-term debt nance, compared to the rms in the control group. In other words,
rms issued long-term debt that they would not have done in the absence of the policy
change.
Our ndings lend support to evidence presented in Mizen and Tsoukas (2014), who
show that the policy initiatives of ABF, ABF-2 and ABMI had a signicant e¤ect on
a rms decision of bond issuance. We also support the ndings of Shim (2012) that
domestic corporate bond markets in emerging Asia experienced a rapid growth from 2005
to 2011 compared to other emerging markets, even during the global nancial crisis. One
of the factors a¤ecting the rapid growth in corporate bond issuances is the functioning
of credit rating agencies, which are established as a part of the government initiatives
(Shim, 2012).
Focusing on rm-level factors, a signicant coe¢ cient on rms size shows that larger
rms have greater access to long-term debt and reduce their short-term debt. This
conrms the nding by Bougheas et al. (2006) that size is an important determinant of
access to bank and market debt. Liquidity of rms shows a negative impact on short-term
debt while, a positive impact on long-term debt suggesting that rms with higher liquidity
are likely to raise more long-term debt and reduce short-term debt. Ozkan (2001) show
that higher liquidity of rms improve access to external nance. Moving to gearing of
rms, it enters with the expected negative and positive signs on short and long-term debt
ratios, respectively. This result is in line with González et al. (2007) for short-term debt
as they conrm that more leveraged rms have less desire for external nancing. On the
other hand, rms with higher leverage are likely to issue more corporate bonds (Mizen
and Tsoukas, 2014), resulting in an increase in access to long-term debt.
Expansion rate measured by investments to assets ratio shows a negative and positive
e¤ect on short and long-term debt ratios, respectively. This indicates that rms with
higher investments are more likely to opt for long-term debt issuance. Operating cycle
measured by sales to assets ratio attains a negative coe¢ cient on long-term debt ratio
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while a positive coe¢ cient on short-term debt ratio. This conrms that rms depend
more on short-term debt rather than long-term debt to nance their increasing sales.
Cash ow enters with a negative coe¢ cient on both long and short-term debt ratios
which show that rms with substantial cash ow require less in terms of external nance.
Country-specic determinants include GDP growth, legal regulation and balance of
trade. GDP growth is generally insignicant, but the balance of trade shows a positive
e¤ect on short-term debt and an insignicant e¤ect on long-term debt. Improvement
in the balance of trade, an indicator of economic health of a country, increases access
to external nancing in the form of short-term debt. Finally, legal regulation registers
a positive e¤ect on long-term debt ratio and a negative e¤ect on short-term debt ratio.
This implies that with an improvement in countrys legal framework, rms are more likely
to increase their long-term debt issuance rather than the short-term debt exposure.
5.2 Accounting for rm-level heterogeneity
In this section, we explore the link between the policy shift and rmsnancing
while taking into account rm-level heterogeneity. The results are reported in Table
3. Columns 1-2 provide results for rms with low and high prots, followed by low
and high coverage ratios in columns 3-4 for short-term debt ratio. Similarly, results for
the long-term debt ratio for di¤erent classication schemes are reported in columns 5-8.
The estimation results provide evidence that constrained rms were mainly una¤ected
by the policy change. On the other hand, unconstrained rms reduced their access to
short-term debt and increased their access to long-term debt after the policy initiative.
In sum, we nd that the policy initiative had an important impact on the choice of
external nance, though its proportional e¤ect was very heterogenous across constrained
and unconstrained rms. One explanation for the above nding is related to the fact
that that nancially constrained rms typically face higher external nancing costs (see
Fazzari et al., 1988). Hence, they are less likely to have access to external nance as they
face higher agency costs of borrowing from nancial markets when compared with the
cost of internal nancing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
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In economic terms, after the introduction of the policy, unconstrained rms in the
treated group reduced their access to short-term debt by around 9.45%-9.51%, while they
increased their access to long-term debt by 18.25%-26.84%, compared to unconstrained
rms in the control group. The test of equality for constrained and unconstrained rms
also shows a signicant di¤erence at 5% level for both short and long-term debt ratios.
Thus, unconstrained rms are able to reap more readily the benets from the policy
change, compared to their constrained counterparts.
5.3 The impact on investment spending
This section takes into account the role of rmsnancing position in inuencing
the impact of the policy initiative on investment spending. Table 4 reports the results
of post-policy rmsinvestment spending for di¤erent measures of leverage15. Column
1 summarises the results for short-term debt to total debt and in column 2 leverage is
measured as long-term debt to total assets.
We nd that the interaction term of leverage and DD is negative for rmsinvest-
ment spending in column 1 and positive in column 2. These point estimates, which are
statistically signicant at the 1% level, indicate that as rmsaccess to short-term debt
was reduced after the policy implementation, rms curtailed their investment spending
using short-term debt. On the contrary, rmsincreased access to total long-term debt
after the policy helped them to spend more of long-term debt on their investment outlay.
The magnitude of the interacted coe¢ cients suggests that after the implementation of
policy, rms reduced their investment spending using short-term debt by 10.04%, while
increased their investment spending using long-term debt by 67.65%.
With respect to other control variables, both sales growth and cash ow have a positive
and signicant coe¢ cient for investments in almost all the columns. This result is again
in line with the empirical studies such as Fazzari et al. (1988) and Wei and Zhang (2008)
which show that rmscash ow per unit of capital is positively related to the rate of
investment per unit of capital, even when a measure of Q is included as an explanatory
15The term After*Lev has been omitted from the results due to very high correlation with other
variables such as Treat*After*Lev and Lev.
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variable of investment.
Overall, the results show that the growth of Asian domestic bond markets has helped
rms to nance their investments by increasing their access to long-term debt. Levinger
et al. (2014) show that the strong growth in Asias corporate bond markets has made
funds available for investment and expansion in recent years along with deepening of
capital markets and diversication of nancing sources.
5.4 Accounting for rm-level heterogeneity
Next, we explore the link between the policy change and rmsnancing while cate-
gorising rms into nancially constrained and unconstrained. Table 5 reports the results
of the post-policy investment spending and leverage for constrained and unconstrained
rms. The results indicate that the policy initiative did not have any signicant impact
on constrained rmsinvestment spending. On the contrary, unconstrained rms reduced
their investment spending using short-term debt and increased their investment spending
using long-term debt after the introduction of the policy. The economic interpretation is
even more interesting since it suggests that unconstrained rms reduced their investment
spending using short-term debt by 9.78%-12.67%, while they increased their investment
spending using long-term debt by 88.50%-89.60%. However, the test of equality does
not show a signicant di¤erence between the two groups for short-term debt ratio but
it shows a signicant di¤erence between the groups at the 5% level for long-term debt
ratio. In sum, we nd once again that it is the unconstrained group of rms in the treated
group that beneted the most from the policy initiative in comparison to the rms in the
control group.
6 Robustness tests
6.1 Propensity score matching
To check the validity of our treated and control groups, we employ a propensity
score matching technique. We use one to one matching technique of our rms without
19
replacement. This means that once an untreated rm has been selected to be matched
to a given treated rm, that untreated rm is no longer available for consideration as
a potential match for subsequent treated rms. Hence, each untreated rm is included
in at most one matched set. Matching without replacement increases the e¢ ciency of
matching, compared to matching with replacement. However, despite theoretical di¤er-
ences several studies have provided evidence that the number of matches and the choice
of matching with or without replacement has a minimum e¤ect on treatment e¤ects bias
and e¢ ciency (Stuart, 2010). Matching is done using non-categorical variables such as
rm size, liquidity, leverage, expansion rate, operating cycle and cash ow, using caliper
0.001 (Yörük, 2008)16.
The results of the main variables of interest are reported in Table 6. The results in
panel A conrm the signicant and positive impact of the policy initiative on rmsaccess
to long-term debt ratio and the negative impact on access to short-term debt ratio. Panel
B validates that the policy initiative helped unconstrained rms to increase their access
to long-term debt and reduce their short-term nance. Panel C shows that rms reduced
their investment spending using short-term debt, while they increased their investment
spending using long-term debt after the policy was introduced. Finally, in panel D we
nd that the relationship between external nance and investment spending is stronger
for unconstrained rms compared to their constrained counterparts. Thus, we conrm
that our results are robust to a matching technique, which also vindicates the validity of
the control and treatment groups in our main models.
6.2 Using the ABF index as a measure of treatment
To further corroborate the accurate identication of the policy initiative on the
treated group, we use an index as a measure of the treatment. Specically, we use the
Markit iBoxx ABF index which is designed to reect the performance of the local currency
denominated sovereign and quasi sovereign debt from 8 Asian countries/territories. The
16Although not reported here, we also use caliper as 0.0001 for the propensity score matching method.
In every procedure with calipers 0.001 and 0.0001, the propensity score and the coe¢ cient estimate of
almost all the control variables are statistically indi¤erent between the treated and control group.
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index gives a broad coverage of the sovereign and sub-sovereign bond universe of the
treated countries whilst upholding minimum standards of investability and liquidity17.
The results shown in Table 7 conrm that our main ndings are upheld. We continue
to observe that rms reduced their access to short-term debt, while increasing their
access to long-term debt in the post-policy period. Further, we nd that rms reduced
their investment spending using short-term debt while they increased their nancing of
investment spending using long-term debt. Thus, we can conclude that employing an
index as a measure of treatment does not alter our results.
6.3 Addressing potential endogeneity concerns
This section considers an instrumental variable method (two-stage least squares
2SLS) to deal with the potential endogeneity of our explanatory variables and the bond
market policy initiative. The identication of the policy initiative requires an exogenous
variable which is correlated with the policy of bond market development but does not
directly impact rmsaccess to external nance. As plausible exogenous instruments for
the policy initiative, legal origin of a country as British, French and German origin are
implemented. Legal origin has also been used as an instrument for nancial development
by Liberti and Mian (2010)18. La porta et al. (2008) show that a countrys legal origins
based on British, French, German, or Scandinavian legal origins have a statistically large
impact on its level of nancial development. Beck et al. (2003) further stress that legal
traditions of a country a¤ect the ability of a system to adjust to changing commercial
requirements and encourages nancial development of a country.
In addition to the policy initiative, it is also assumed that all control variables used
in the model are endogenous and they are instrumented using their own values lagged
twice. The validity and importance of the instruments for both the policy and other
control variables are veried using a number a diagnostic tests. The results for these
17The index history statistics starts on 31/12/2000 and covers a variety of markets with small (Hong
Kong, Singapore) and large (Korea, China) bond markets. Using simple weights will skew the index in
favour of larger markets and reduce the weight of smaller markets. Hence, the baseline weight of these
indices is adjusted by the local bond market size, sovereign local debt rating and GEMLOC investability
indicator.
18The data for legal origin are taken from La porta et al. (2008).
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tests are reported at the foot of the tables19.
Table 8 shows the results of the 2SLS model. The results validate a signicant and
positive impact of the policy initiative on rmsaccess to long-term debt ratio and a neg-
ative impact on access to short-term debt ratio, with a stronger e¤ect on unconstrained
rms. Further, the results show that with an increase in rms access to long-term
debt, their post-policy investment spending also increased, while post-policy investment
declined for rms dependent on short-term debt. Finally, the link between leverage and
post-policy investment is much stronger for unconstrained rms compared to their con-
strained counterparts. Other control variables maintain their signicance and expected
signs.
Overall, the diagnostic tests given in Table 9 do not specify any problems regarding
the application of instruments used and provide a reliable robustness check to our main
results.
6.4 Placebo tests
This section presents placebo tests as an additional robustness check. If homogeneity
across time-periods is assumed then similar results should also hold prior to the treatment
period. Following Imberman and Kugler (2012), the di¤erence-in-di¤erences is conducted
for the pre-policy period of 1996-2004. Instead of the reform taking place after 2005, it
is assumed that the reform took place from 2002-200420. If there are any pre-existing
trends, then there should be a signicant impact of the policy on access to nance. This
procedure checks if any underlying trends are inuencing the results. If the results show
insignicant e¤ects of the policy on access to nance, then it proves the validity of the
treatment e¤ect.
Table 10 presents the results which demonstrate an insignicant impact of the policy
initiative on both short-term and long-term debt ratios for both constrained and uncon-
19In addition to the statistics reported at the tables of results, we also employed the Anderson Rubin
chi-square test and obtained identical p-values as with Anderson Rubin F-test.
20Di¤erence-in-di¤erences tests for the pre-policy period are also performed using the reform period
after 1999, 2002 and 2003. The results show almost similar results both quantitatively and qualitatively
as 2002-2004 reform period.
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strained rms. Further, the results of post-policy investment spending and leverage show
an insignicant e¤ect of rmsleverage on post-policy investment outlays for both con-
strained rms and their counterparts. In sum, the placebo test strengthens the validity
of the empirical strategy and main results.
6.5 Additional control variables
While we have considered a wide set of explanatory variables in the main models,
in this section we include additional control variables to ensure that our ndings are not
driven by omitted-variable bias. We include a dummy for the global nancial crisis which
takes value one for the period 2007-2010, and zero otherwise. We also control for other
variables such as stock market capitalisation and global liquidity. The former is likely to
be an important determinant of external nancing as countries with larger stock markets
help rms to increase long term credit and access to external nance (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic, 1999). The latter is measured by the cross-border credit growth in the Asia-
Pacic region. We include this variable to capture the market reactions to quantitative
easing and tapering by United States on emerging economies in terms of capital ows
across borders. Thus, we try to disentangle the impact of the policy initiative on rms
external nancing by controlling for these additional variables.
The results are reported in Table 11 and conrm that the policy did have a signicant
impact on rmsexternal nancing. The results again conrm that rms increased their
access to long-term debt and reduced their short-term debt. Further, rms increase their
investment spending using long-term debt while they reduce their investment spending
using short-term debt. Finally, we nd that both these relationships are stronger for
unconstrained rms compared to constrained rms.
6.6 Excluding Korea
In order to conrm that our main results are not driven by Korea, which has the
largest bond market in our treated group, we remove it from our sample. The results
are shown in Table 12 and we conrm our main ndings are both qualitatively and
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quantitatively very similar to our main results. Thus, we conclude that the inclusion of
Korea in our sample does not bias our results in any way.
6.7 Alternative classication of rms
In our main empirical results, we classied our rms into constrained and uncon-
strained using the 50th percentile of the distribution in the pre-policy period. In order to
conrm that our results are not driven by the way we divide our sample, we use a robust
framework of classication schemes. Following Tsoukas (2011), we divide our rms into
constrained and unconstrained rms using the 75th percentile as a cut-o¤ point in the
pre-policy period. Thus, constrained rms take value one if their prots and coverage
ratio are below the 75th percentile of the distribution of all the rms in that particular
year, and zero otherwise. Table 13 conrm that the policy helped unconstrained rms
to expand their access to long-term debt and reduce their short-term debt much more
compared to the nancially constrained rms. In addition, unconstrained rms increased
their investment spending using long-term debt much more compared to rms which -
nancially constrained. While in terms of short-term debt, there is no signicant di¤erence
between constrained and unconstrained rms with respect to their post-policy investment
spending. Hence, we conclude that our results are robust to an alternative classication
of rms.
7 Conclusion
After the Asian nancial crisis of 1997-98, the need for developing local nancial
markets was realised in order to reduce over-dependence on a bank-dominated nancial
system and under-developed bond markets. Thus, in order to develop sound and more
liquid bond markets, to prevent further capital account crises and the problem of original
sin, Asian bond market initiatives were introduced in Asian economies21. Using a novel
21The term original sin was introduced by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) which means the
inability of countries to borrow from abroad in their local currencies. It is a key factor of nancial
instability and possibility of default in a country.
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panel dataset on eight Asian countries over a period of 1996 to 2012, we analyse the impact
of the Asian bond market initiatives on rmsaccess to external nance. The results
based on the di¤erence-in-di¤erences method suggest that rmsincreased their access to
long-term debt and reduced their short-term debts after the introduction of the ABF-2.
With respect to the rm-level heterogeneity, the results show that the policy initiatives
helped unconstrained rms to increase their corporate bond issuances and reduce their
bank nance much more compared to their nancially constrained counterparts. Next,
we take into account the inuence of rmsexternal nance on investment spending in the
post-policy period. The results show that increased access to credit for rms in the form
of total long-term debt had a positive impact on rmsinvestment spending. Finally, we
nd that with respect to long-term debt ratio, unconstrained rms are able to increase
their post-policy investment spending much more compared to constrained rms due to
their increased access to long-term debts after policy.
The results of this paper conrm the fact that the Asian bond market initiatives
helped in expanding the Asian domestic nancial markets. Development of the nancial
bond markets helped rms to achieve e¢ cient nancing for business needs, encouraging
investment and growth (Levinger et al., 2014). However, the level of development is
widely diverse between di¤erent ASEAN countries. These policy initiatives have helped
in expanding the local sovereign bond markets in Asia but the progress in terms of corpo-
rate bond markets is still low. In the past, policies have contributed to the development
of domestic sovereign bond markets but very few have focused on the corporate bonds.
Thus, more progress is required for increasing diversied issuer base so that rms can
receive funding from various sources without increasing shock volatility. When signi-
cantly advanced, corporate bond markets can also have a huge e¤ect on investment and
regional growth by supplying long-term funding.
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Figure 1: Size of bond markets for control and treated groups
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Figure 2: Banking sector development in treated and control groups
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Table 1: Statistics for all explanatory variables
Explanatory variables Whole sample Treat Control p-value Before ABF-2 After ABF-2 p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Short-term debt (in USD bn) 47.03 60.10 3.15 0.000 46.37 47.45 0.629
(266.61) (302.41) (14.64) (260.73) (270.34)
Long-term debt (in USD bn) 52.29 66.89 2.91 0.000 49.06 54.41 0.051
(328.68) (372.80) (14.37) (299.32) (346.62)
Firm size 8.41 8.42 8.37 0.127 8.17 8.56 0.000
(3.11) (3.43) (1.59) (3.10) (3.11)
Liquidity 2.12 2.07 2.27 0.000 1.92 2.25 0.000
(1.89) (1.93) (1.77) (1.67) (1.99)
Gearing 1.57 1.66 1.29 0.000 1.72 1.48 0.000
(2.40) (2.49) (2.07) (2.59) (2.27)
Expansion rate 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.001 0.47 0.48 0.033
(0.35) (0.36) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35)
Operating cycle 6.36 5.98 7.47 0.000 4.96 7.21 0.000
(12.84) (12.20) (14.53) (10.09) (14.19)
Cash ow 9.10 9.12 9.03 0.301 9.26 9.00 0.002
(8.47) (8.51) (8.37) (8.22) (8.61)
Investment spending 5.24 5.27 5.16 0.053 5.37 5.15 0.000
(5.40) (5.39) (5.43) (5.56) (5.29)
Tobins Q 0.08 0.84 0.81 0.334 0.09 0.08 0.000
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.28)
GDP growth 4.44 4.46 4.38 0.033 4.41 4.45 0.200
(3.64) (3.72) (3.35) (4.12) (3.30)
Legal regulation 5.50 5.06 5.63 0.000 5.91 5.26 0.000
(3.64) (0.52) (1.98) (1.71) (1.77)
Balance of trade 6.25 6.41 5.68 0.000 6.91 5.83 0.000
(9.10) (10.28) (1.43) (9.06) (9.10)
Observations 62,237 48,375 13,862 24,174 38,063
Notes : The table presents sample means with standard deviations in parentheses. The p-values of test of equalities
of means are reported. Treatis a dummy that takes value one for the rms in countries which participated in the policy
initiative of 2005, and zero otherwise. Afteris a dummy that takes value one for the period from 2005-2012 and zero oth-
erwise. Firm size: Log of total assets. Liquidity: Current assets/Current liabilities. Gearing: Total liabilities/Shareholders
equity. Expansion rate: Total investments/Total assets. Operating cycle: Net sales/Net xed assets. Cash ow: Earnings
before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization/Total assets. Investment spending: Capital expenditures/
Total assets. Tobins Q: Sales growth is used as a proxy. GDP growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency. Legal regulation: An index of 0 to 10 based on a survey question of The legal
and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness of enterprises. Balance of trade: Sum of exports and imports
of goods and services measured as a share of GDP.
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Table 2: Policy initiative and access to external nance
Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
(1) (2)
Treat*After -3.110*** 1.073***
(-3.51) (3.79)
Firm size -5.614*** 2.877***
(-10.46) (13.37)
Liquidity -5.111*** 0.354***
(-19.77) (5.89)
Gearing -0.732*** 1.209***
(-6.06) (15.21)
Expansion rate -10.691*** 4.534***
(-7.17) (7.85)
Operating cycle 0.141*** -0.031***
(4.75) (-4.00)
Cash ow -0.105*** -0.081***
(-3.83) (-9.08)
GDP growth -0.047 0.015
(-0.70) (0.59)
Legal regulation -0.930*** 0.415***
(-3.23) (4.35)
Balance of Trade 0.125** 0.014
(2.53) (0.82)
Predicted probability 63.80 8.97
N 42,117 46,061
R2 0.074 0.109
No. of rms 5,912 6,100
Notes : In column 1 the dependent variable is the short-term debt to total debt, while in column 2 the dependent
variable is the long-term debt to total assets. Country dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies are
included in the models with xed e¤ects and standard errors clustered over rms. Robust t-statistics are reported in the
parentheses. Statistical signicance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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Table 3: Access to external nance and rm heterogeneity
Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat*After -0.332 -6.096*** -0.756 -6.152*** 0.417 1.619*** -0.279 2.131***
(-0.26) (-4.53) (-0.64) (-4.23) (0.89) (4.45) (-0.54) (6.75)
Firm size -5.354*** -6.435*** -5.558*** -6.302*** 2.870*** 2.971*** 2.907*** 2.406***
(-5.64) (-7.88) (-6.16) (-7.84) (7.13) (9.42) (7.30) (9.25)
Liquidity -5.344*** -5.204*** -6.770*** -4.564*** 0.362*** 0.419*** 1.086*** 0.229***
(-11.93) (-15.70) (-12.07) (-14.72) (3.31) (6.45) (6.48) (4.31)
Gearing -0.325** -1.320*** -0.330** -1.448*** 0.782*** 1.722*** 0.790*** 1.727***
(-2.23) (-6.14) (-2.39) (-5.97) (7.83) (13.14) (8.52) (12.06)
Expansion rate -7.825*** -11.527*** -9.455*** -10.954*** 3.668*** 4.953*** 4.708*** 3.716***
(-3.42) (-5.77) (-4.25) (-4.87) (3.99) (6.65) (4.94) (5.55)
Operating cycle 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.124*** 0.147*** -0.038*** -0.027*** -0.047*** -0.030***
(2.93) (3.36) (2.71) (3.43) (-2.86) (-2.74) (-2.81) (-3.51)
Cash ow -0.191*** -0.062 -0.173*** -0.090** -0.016 -0.104*** 0.001 -0.061***
(-4.09) (-1.61) (-3.82) (-2.36) (-0.98) (-9.12) (0.04) (-6.23)
GDP growth -0.130 -0.021 -0.179* 0.098 0.013 0.014 0.028 -0.004
(-1.23) (-0.23) (-1.90) (1.02) (0.30) (0.46) (0.63) (-0.14)
Legal regulation -1.618*** -0.395 -1.129*** -0.538 0.366** 0.391*** 0.276 0.338***
(-3.41) (-1.09) (-2.60) (-1.40) (2.03) (3.68) (1.52) (3.40)
Balance of Trade 0.087 0.064 0.104 0.069 -0.017 0.032 -0.018 0.019
(1.17) (0.95) (1.44) (1.00) (-0.61) (1.62) (-0.57) (1.12)
Predicted probability 62.05 64.52 60.75 64.67 9.90 8.87 11.49 7.94
N 16,368 25,749 16,616 25,501 17,400 28,661 16,893 29,168
R2 0.086 0.077 0.116 0.066 0.085 0.132 0.116 0.113
No. of rms 2,684 4,980 2657 4929 2,744 5,186 2658 5151
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After 0.002 0.004 0.042 0.000
Notes : The p-value refers to the test of equality between constrained and unconstrained rms. Robust t-statistics are
reported in the parenthesis. Statistical signicance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Also, see notes to Table
2.
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Table 4: Post-policy investment and access to external nance
Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
(1) (2)
Treat*After*Lev -0.523** 3.450***
(-2.26) (5.36)
Sales growth 0.820*** 0.768***
(8.74) (8.65)
Cash ow 0.032*** 0.037***
(6.12) (7.72)
Lev -1.134*** 5.002***
(-4.90) (5.20)
Treat*After 0.487** -0.192
(2.09) (-1.22)
Treat*Lev -0.071 -3.171***
(-0.24) (-2.91)
Predicted probability 5.21 5.10
N 39,300 42,926
R2 0.054 0.053
No. of rms 5,675 5,861
Notes : The dependent variable is rm-level investment spending measured as the ratio of capital expenditures to total
assets. Lev is measured as short-term debt to total debt in column 1 and long-term debt to total assets in column 2.
Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical signicance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Also, see notes to Table 2.
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Table 5: Firm-level heterogeneity for post-policy investment and leverage
Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat*After*Lev -0.470 -0.754** -0.365 -0.572* 1.422 5.117*** 1.553* 5.018***
(-1.45) (-2.10) (-1.07) (-1.69) (1.47) (5.42) (1.87) (3.89)
Sales growth 0.729*** 0.794*** 0.742*** 0.775*** 0.684*** 0.741*** 0.725*** 0.689***
(5.54) (5.82) (5.16) (6.05) (5.48) (5.81) (5.17) (5.87)
Cash ow 0.016** 0.021*** 0.018** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.034***
(1.96) (2.78) (2.20) (3.50) (2.89) (3.89) (2.90) (5.06)
Lev -1.967*** -0.650** -1.920*** -0.673** 6.854*** 3.357** 6.415*** 3.869***
(-4.79) (-2.28) (-4.80) (-2.41) (4.71) (2.45) (4.95) (2.74)
Treat*After 0.126 0.772** 0.248 0.575* -0.371 -0.111 -0.232 -0.165
(0.37) (2.26) (0.73) (1.70) (-1.57) (-0.49) (-0.94) (-0.79)
Treat*Lev 0.686 -0.295 0.605 -0.481 -3.220** -3.002* -4.014*** -1.654
(1.42) (-0.70) (1.25) (-1.18) (-1.99) (-1.88) (-2.80) (-0.90)
Predicted probability 4.20 5.95 4.34 5.85 4.10 5.77 4.19 5.67
N 15,715 23,585 15,914 23,386 16,707 26,219 16195 26731
R2 0.051 0.068 0.058 0.064 0.050 0.065 0.058 0.062
No. of rms 2,542 4,588 2,513 4,556 2,594 4,787 2,513 4,769
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After*Lev 0.575 0.678 0.006 0.023
Notes : The p-value refers to the test of equality between constrained and unconstrained rms. Robust t-statistics are
reported in the parenthesis. Statistical signicance is denoted at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Also, see notes to Table 4.
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Table 6: Robustness: Propensity score matching
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After -4.293*** 1.379***
(-3.95) (4.25)
N 22,584 25,609
R2 0.093 0.119
Panel 2: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After -1.426 -6.770*** -0.320 -7.039*** 0.470 1.681*** -0.053 1.982***
(-0.84) (-4.19) (-1.57) (-4.04) (0.86) (4.11) (-0.09.) (5.81)
N 8,707 13,877 8,650 13,934 9,561 16,048 9,000 16,609
R2 0.103 0.110 0.134 0.096 0.111 0.157 0.126 0.139
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After 0.023 0.014 0.080 0.004
Dependent variable: Investment spending
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After*Lev -0.843** 4.578***
(-2.30) (3.73)
N 20,631 22,931
R2 0.059 0.057
Panel 4: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After*Lev -1.099** -1.152** -0.947 -1.002* 3.999** 6.480*** 2.708 5.951**
(-2.13) (-1.97) (-1.53) (-1.90) (2.16) (3.64) (1.51) (2.50)
N 8,192 12,439 8,073 12,558 8,805 14,126 8,271 14,660
R2 0.058 0.082 0.060 0.078 0.055 0.076 0.059 0.070
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After*Lev 0.952 0.952 0.332 0.276
Notes : The Table reports regression results for propensity score matching technique. The remaining specications,
which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2 to 5. Statistical signicance is denoted at 1%(***),
5%(**) and 10%(*). Also, see notes to Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 7: Robustness: ABF index
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
ABF index*After -0.168* 0.097***
(-1.67) (2.59)
N 26,887 29,117
R2 0.066 0.100
Panel 2: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
ABF index*After -0.146 0.060 -0.260* 0.057 0.061 0.034 0.122* 0.008
(-0.90) (0.39) (-1.88) (0.32) (0.95) (0.64) (1.74) (0.20)
N 9,896 16,991 9,909 16,978 10,464 18,653 10,031 19,086
R2 0.083 0.068 0.117 0.054 0.077 0.124 0.127 0.110
Test of equality
p.value: ABF index*After 0.342 0.165 0.865 0.107
Dependent variable: Investment spending
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
ABF index*After*Lev -0.004** 0.021***
(-2.12) (4.06)
N 26,019 28,162
R2 0.044 0.042
Panel 4: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
ABF index*After*Lev -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.010 0.021*** 0.009 0.006
(-1.37) (-1.41) (-1.00) (-1.15) (1.16) (2.82) (1.16) (0.63)
N 9,946 16,073 9,928 16,091 10,511 17,651 10,054 18,108
R2 0.034 0.061 0.037 0.059 0.034 0.059 0.035 0.059
Test of equality
p.value: ABF index*After*Lev 0.999 0.999 0.441 0.834
Notes : The Table reports regression results for propensity score matching technique. The remaining specications,
which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2 to 5. Statistical signicance is denoted at 1%(***),
5%(**) and 10%(*). Also, see notes to Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 8: Robustness: IV regressions
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After -3.426*** 1.161***
(-3.69) (3.89)
N 32,555 35,776
R2 0.071 0.104
Panel 2: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After -0.410 -6.425*** -0.660 -6.095*** 0.343 1.784*** -0.487 2.244***
(-0.31) (-4.60) (-0.52) (-4.08) (0.69) (4.72) (-0.90) (6.77)
N 12,253 19,428 12,601 19,130 13,069 21,829 12,837 22,124
R2 0.080 0.075 0.112 0.062 0.081 0.126 0.110 0.103
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After 0.002 0.005 0.022 0.000
Dependent variable: Investment spending
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After*Lev -2.431 7.509***
(-6.12) (4.90)
N 18,051 24,289
R2 0.020 0.022
Panel 4: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After*Lev -0.623 -2.390*** 0.523 -2.244*** 2.368 4.918** -1.083 8.141***
(-1.60) (-4.48) (-1.11) (-4.07) (0.83) (2.55) (-0.42) (4.01)
N 7,430 7,033 7,686 7,238 9,654 14,422 9,428 14,736
R2 -0.140 0.029 -0.557 0.029 -0.760 0.023 -0.628 0.025
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After*Lev 0.007 0.017 0.459 0.005
Notes : Robust z-statistics for IV(2SLS) regressions are reported in the parenthesis. The remaining specications,
which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2 to 5. Statistical signicance is denoted at 1%(***),
5%(**) and 10%(*). Also, see notes to Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 9: Robustness: IV diagnostic tests
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Kleibergen-Paap 0.000 0.000
Anderson-Rubin 0.000 0.000
Stock-Wright 0.000 0.000
Hansen J 0.778 0.698
Panel 2: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Kleibergen-Paap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Anderson-Rubin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stock-Wright 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J 0.693 0.562 0.456 0.361 0.624 0.841 0.811 0.898
Dependent variable: Investment spending
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Kleibergen-Paap 0.000 0.000
Anderson-Rubin 0.000 0.000
Stock-Wright 0.000 0.000
Hansen J 0.715 0.764
Panel 4: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Kleibergen-Paap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Anderson-Rubin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stock-Wright 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J 0.226 0.515 0.398 0.660 0.472 0.194 0.505 0.179
Notes : The Table provides diagnostic tests for IV regressions models reported in Table 8. The Kleibergen-Paap
is a test of under-identication distributed as chi-square under the null of under-identication. The Anderson Rubin
and Stock-Wright LM S statistic are weak-instrument-robust inference tests, which are distributed as F-test and chi-square
respectively, under the null that coe¢ cients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero,
and the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Hansen J statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed
as chi-square under the null of instrument validity.
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Table 10: Robustness: Placebo test
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After -0.467 -0.989*
(-0.26) (-1.67)
N 15,387 16,492
R2 0.097 0.096
Panel 2: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After -3.363 7.460* -1.973 5.080 -0.399 -2.507*** -1.007 -1.446
(-1.26) (1.74) (-0.84) (1.19) (-0.32) (-2.69) (-0.82) (-1.56)
N 4,809 8,999 4,925 8,883 4,982 9,814 4,952 9,844
R2 0.110 0.102 0.142 0.095 0.087 0.142 0.121 0.128
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After 0.032 0.149 0.180 0.764
Dependent variable: Investment spending
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After*Lev 0.493 -0.531
(1.53) (-0.67)
N 13,145 14,049
R2 0.070 0.066
Panel 4: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After*Lev 0.678 0.841 0.841 0.268 -2.438* 0.417 -1.567 2.641
(1.28) (1.42) (1.54) (0.46) (-1.67) (0.27) (-1.31) (1.25)
N 4,527 7,166 4,641 7,052 4,692 7,800 4,668 7,824
R2 0.109 0.058 0.126 0.045 0.103 0.056 0.126 0.047
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After*Lev 0.841 0.478 0.174 0.084
Notes : Table provides placebo test results. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The remaining
specications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2 to 5. Statistical signicance is denoted
at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Also, see notes to Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 11: Robustness: Including additional control variables
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After -3.640*** 1.302***
(-4.05) (4.64)
N 37,922 41,673
R2 0.078 0.099
Panel 2: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After -0.920 -6.844*** -1.353 -6.907*** 0.709 1.912*** -0.023 2.348***
(-0.71) (-5.02) (-1.12) (-4.71) (1.51) (5.28) (-0.04) (7.42)
N 14,310 23,612 14,488 23,434 15,289 26,384 14,764 26,909
R2 0.088 0.082 0.120 0.068 0.075 0.124 0.112 0.108
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After 0.002 0.003 0.046 0.000
Dependent variable: Investment spending
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After*Lev -0.740*** 3.796***
(-3.03) (5.52)
N 35,828 39,292
R2 0.046 0.045
Panel 4: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After*Lev -0.471 -0.933** -0.520 -0.695* 1.565 4.571*** 1.840** 3.517**
(-1.37) (-2.43) (-1.42) (-1.94) (1.53) (4.37) (2.04) (2.31)
N 13,928 21,900 14,064 21,764 14,872 24,420 14,344 24,948
R2 0.033 0.065 0.035 0.062 0.034 0.062 0.035 0.060
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After*Lev 0.368 0.735 0.039 0.342
Notes : Table provides test results using additional control variables. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis.
The remaining specications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2 to 5. Statistical
signicance is denoted at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Also, see notes to Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 12: Robustness: Excluding Korea
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After -3.429*** 1.199***
(-3.58) (3.94)
N 34,850 38,570
R2 0.073 0.109
Panel 2: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After -0.436 -6.468*** -0.355 -6.728*** 0.463 1.594*** -0.406 2.247***
(-0.31) (-4.51) (-0.27) (-4.30) (0.92) (4.06) (-0.74) (6.68)
N 14,135 20,715 14,274 20,576 15,123 23,447 14,545 24,025
R2 0.084 0.079 0.112 0.068 0.081 0.140 0.113 0.121
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After 0.002 0.002 0.073 0.000
Dependent variable: Investment spending
Panel 3: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Treat*After*Lev -0.271 2.755***
(-1.07) (3.81)
N 32,777 36,231
R2 0.056 0.054
Panel 4: Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After*Lev -0.377 -0.417 -0.303 -0.415 0.525 3.336 0.533 3.892***
(-1.07) (-1.05) (-0.80) (-1.11) (0.50) (3.24) (0.58) (2.99)
N 13,599 19,178 13,662 19,115 14,550 21,681 13,938 22,293
R2 0.051 0.069 0.060 0.067 0.049 0.066 0.059 0.063
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After*Lev 0.936 0.818 0.057 0.035
Notes : Table provides results excluding Korea. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The remaining
specications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2 to 5. Statistical signicance is denoted
at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Also, see notes to Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 13: Robustness: Alternative classication schemes
Panel 1: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After -0.287 -10.113*** -1.962** -8.053*** 0.604* 2.075*** 0.591 2.098***
(-0.29) (-4.74) (-2.12) (-3.39) (1.73) (4.00) (1.55) (6.15)
N 25,735 16,382 25,508 16,609 27,491 18,570 25,944 20,117
R2 0.083 0.082 0.118 0.058 0.099 0.121 0.123 0.104
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After 0.000 0.017 0.019 0.003
Dependent variable: Investment spending
Panel 2: Short-term debt to total debt Long-term debt to total assets
Prot Coverage ratio Prot Coverage ratio
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Treat*After*Lev -0.503* -1.347** -0.660** -0.688 2.064*** 6.012*** 2.739*** 2.224
(-1.90) (-2.57) (-2.36) (-1.45) (2.65) (4.04) (3.72) (0.63)
N 24,643 14,657 24,359 14,941 26,329 16,597 24,802 18,124
R2 0.053 0.074 0.057 0.068 0.051 0.072 0.055 0.064
Test of equality
p.value: Treat*After*Lev 0.142 0.096 0.019 0.487
Notes : Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The remaining specications, which are not reported for
brevity, are identical to those in Tables 2 to 5. Statistical signicance is denoted at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*). Also,
see notes to Tables 2 and 4.
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On-line Appendix
Table A1: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables
Size Liq. Gearing Exp. rt. Op. cy. CF GDP gr. LR Trade INV Sales gr.
Size 1.000
Liq. -0.183 1.000
Gearing 0.213 -0.314 1.000
Exp. rt. 0.069 -0.193 0.001 1.000
Op. cy. -0.078 0.059 -0.032 -0.432 1.000
CF 0.064 0.093 -0.158 0.123 -0.017 1.000
GDP gr. -0.095 0.022 -0.042 -0.028 0.034 0.049 1.000
LR -0.700 0.077 -0.113 0.113 0.048 -0.024 0.202 1.000
Trade -0.445 0.037 -0.033 -0.001 0.003 -0.024 0.077 0.335 1.000
INV 0.093 -0.115 -0.015 0.306 -0.212 0.261 0.030 -0.029 -0.071 1.000
Sales gr. 0.066 -0.048 0.022 -0.063 0.050 0.302 0.176 0.020 -0.044 0.144 1.000
Notes : Abbreviations: Size: Firm size Liq.: Liquidity. Gearing: gearing. Exp. rt: Expansion rate. Op. cy.: Operating
cycle. CF: cash ow. GDP gr.: GDP growth. LR: Legal regulation. Trade: Balance of trade. INV: Investment spending.
Sales gr.: Sales growth
Table A2: Denition of variables
Variables Description Source
Treat A country dummy which takes value 1 if a country participates in ABF, ABF-2 or Authorsinterpretation
ABMI and 0 otherwise
After A time dummy which takes value 1 for years after 2005 and 0 otherwise Authorsinterpretation
Treat*After The di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DD) coe¢ cient measuring the policy e¤ect Authorsinterpretation
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets Compustat Global
Liquidity Current assets/ Current liabilities Compustat Global
Gearing Total liabilities/ Shareholders equity Compustat Global
Expansion rate Total investments/Total assets Compustat Global
Operating cycle Net sales/ Net xed assets Compustat Global
Cash ow Earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization/ Total Compustat Global
assets (%)
Investment spending Capital expenditure/ Total assets Compustat Global
Tobins Q Sales growth is used as the proxy Compustat Global
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on Global Financial
constant local currency Database (GFD)
Legal regulation It is a measure based on an index from 0 to 10. The survey question reads as The IMD WCY
legal and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness of enterprises
Balance of Trade Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP GFD
Legal origin A dummy takes value 1 based on countrys legal origins as British, French, German La porta et al. (2008)
Market capitalisation Market capitalisation is the share price times the number of shares outstanding
as a percentage of GDP
Crisis A time dummy which takes value 1 for years after 2007-2010 and 0 otherwise Authorsinterpretation
Global liquidity Global cross-border credit in Asia-Pacic region (YOY %) BIS
Notes : The Table provides the denitions of the variables used in the models.
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